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Introduction 
In  December  2009,  we  conducted  an  international  research  project  on  human 
behavior  and  decision  making.  We  invited  students  from  University  of  the 
Incarnate  Word  (US)
1  and  the  University  of  Applied  Sciences  Kaiserslautern 
(Germany) in classes and through the internet as well as the general public via 
newspaper articles to participate in a so-called Ultimatum Bargaining Game. 
The inheritance of aunt Luise in the amount of 1,200 EUR – app. 1,600 USD in 
funding provided by the German university - was to be split up between three 
beneficiaries.  
Three randomly selected participants slipped into the roles of the beneficiaries – 
Andy, Berta and Carlos. Due to the will of aunt Luise, the inheritance is to be 
devided up according to the following rules: Andy has the right to propose the 
distribution  of  the  1,200  EUR.  Berta  can  accept  or  reject  this  proposal.  She 
therefore has the right to veto Andy’s proposal. If Berta accepts Andy’s proposal, 
the  total  amount  will  be  split  according  to  the  proposed  distribution.  If  Berta 
rejects Andy’s proposal, none of the three will receive any money. It will all go to 
charity,  or  like  in  our  experiment,  three  other  beneficiaries  are  to  be  selected 
randomly.  Carlos  can  neither  influence  the  proposal  of  distribution  nor  its 
1 During the fall semester 2009, Marc Piazolo spent a sabbatical at the catholic University 
of the Incarnate Word (UIW), San Antonio, Texas. UIW is one of the sister schools of the 
University of Applied Sciences Kaiserslautern. 
315acceptance or rejection.
2 In our basic version of the experiment, Andy’s role as 
proposer is auctioned off. All participants were asked to place a bid for their right 
of proposing.  
We extended this basic structure of the experiment by including a second version, 
in which the role of the proposer was to be selected randomly – only after – the 
proposer decided on his proposal. The division of the actual funds is based on the 
basic version of our three person ultimatum bargaining game. 
We were hoping that this research project would provide answers to the following 
questions:  
(1.)  What  role  does  fairness  and  rationality  play,  when  people  got  to  make  a 
decision on splitting up a considerable amount of funds?  
(2.)  How  do  participants  evaluate  different  kind  of  proposals  –  again  taking 
fairness and rationality into account?  
(3.) Are there significant differences in human behavior between US-Americans 
und Europeans? 
What does economic theory tell us? 
Basic microeconomic theory in decision making usually assumes that economic 
agents  behave  rationally  –  no  matter  if  they  are  employees,  managers  or 
politicians.  The  concept  of  a  rational  decision  maker  is  called  Homo 
Oeconomicus.  The  decision  maker  aims  to  maximize  his  financial  wealth  or 
personal  utility.  Though,  past  economic  experiments  –  in  the  field  and  in  the 
laboratory  –  have  shown,  that  many  participants  behave  in  a  reciprocal  way 
(Homo Reciprocans). They honor friendly behavior and punish non-cooperative 
behavior.  Sometimes,  they  are  even  willing  to  accept  financial  losses  when 
punishing non-cooperative behavior. In our experiment, they would loose their 
proposed share of inheritance.  
1  Characteristics of our participants  
Out of 520 participants, 509 decision sheets were valuable. This is the highest rate 
of participation for our internet experiments so far. The majority of participants 
(43%) live within 100 km of Kaiserslautern, while another 20% are from other 
parts  of  Germany.  Almost  one  third  of  all  participants  are  US  nationals.
3  On 
average, the participants are 29.5 years old – the youngest being 10 and the oldest 
76. This relative low average age is due to the fact that just more than half of our 
2 The general set-up of the experiment is based on Güth et al. (2003). One finds additional 
variations of Ultimatum Bargaining Games in Holt (2007).
3 The remaining five percent are mainly from Austria and Switzerland - in addition to 
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participants are still studying at a university. Less than a third are female, while 
half of the participants are business or economics majors.  
There are several differences in characteristics of participants from Europe
4 and 
the United States: less females in Europe (25% vs. 51%), a larger US-share of 
highly educated participants (27% with Master degrees & Ph.D.s vs. 18%) as well 
as a larger share of US-participants with a background in business & economics 
(57% vs. 47%). On the other hand, almost one fifth of our German participants 
have  a  background  in  engineering  (only  4%  in  the  US).  In  addition  to  our 
experiment, everyone participated in a simple test of intelligence as well as in 
describing his or her personal risk preference. Americans seem to be more risk 
prone, while they underperformed in the cognitive reflection test.
5
2  List of Proposals and Decision making 
Andy and Berta had to choose from 18 different proposals. First, each participant 
had to select one proposal in his or her role as Andy. Afterwards, they slipped into 
the role of Berta. Here, they had to decide to either accept or reject each of the 
individual 18 proposals. We made use of the acceptance rate for each proposal to 
calculate the expected payoff for Andy. 
Table 1:  
Choice of proposals and acceptance ratios 
   1.200 EUR       expected 
All participants  Andy‘s  proposals for split up    Berta’s reaction Payoff for 
n = 509  Choice Andy Berta Carlos accept  reject      Andy (EUR)
   0.20% 0  600  600  78%  22%  0 
   0  200  400  600  60%  40%  120 
   0.79% 200  500  500  81%  19%  162 
   0  200  600  400  82%  18%  164 
   0  400  200  600  32%  68%  128 
   0  400  300  500  42%  58%  168 
Equal split  42.04% 400  400  400  95%  5%  380 
   5.50% 400  500  300  84%  16%  336 
   2.75% 400  600  200  81%  19%  324 
   0  600  100  500  24%  76%  144 
4 95% of the 340 European participants are German residents. 
5 Shane (2005). All participants should describe their risk proneness on a scale of 1 (risk 
averse) to 5 (risk prone).  On average, US-Americans were statistically significant more 
risk prone than Germans (3.4 vs. 2.9). A result that resembles the one of Fehr et al. (2002) 
in: Falk et al. (2009).
317   0  600  200  400  30%  70%  180 
   4.52% 600  300  300  50%  50%  300 
   10.81% 600  400  200  64%  36%  384 
Power 
coalition  17.87% 600  500  100  69%  31%  414 
   0.20% 800  100  300  24%  76%  192 
   1.38% 800  200  200  32%  68%  256 
   5.30% 800  300  100  39%  61%  312 
Homo 
Oeconomicus 8.65% 1000  100  100  25%  75%  250 
Average inheritance per 
person in EUR 543  391  266 
Andy – the proposer (all participants) 
Most of our participants (42%, first column in table 1) propose a fair and equal 
split  of  400  EUR  for  each  of  the  beneficiaries.  The  second  most  important 
proposals are the so-called power coalition(s) with 18% and 11% of the votes: 
Andy and Berta both profit from agreeing bilaterally on a reduced inheritance of 
Carlos, as the latter has no rights at all. Only 8.5% of our participants propose a 
split up that leaves Andy with the highest payoff possible (1.000 EUR), while 
Berta and Carolos only get 100 EUR each. This is the proposal that reflects a 
profit maximizing Homo Oeconomicus the closest.
6 Half of all proposals were 
not chosen at all, or by less than 1% of the participants. Based on their different 
roles, it is not very surprising that the average financial sum proposed for Andy is 
more than twice the amount for the powerless Carlos (543 EUR vs. 266 EUR).
7  
Berta – with veto power (all participants)
As Berta, allmost all participants accept an equal split. For the power coalition
the rate of acceptance drops to 69%, while the proposal linked to the concept of 
Homo Oeconomicus is rejected by three quarters of our particpants. This reaction 
is quite irrational, as Berta relinquishes an inheritance worth 100 EUR – for the 
sake of rebuffing Andy’s extremely unfair proposal. All of the proposals for which 
Berta receives only 100-200 EUR, are rejected by more than two thirds of all 
participants. Even though it’s acceptance rate is low, the expected payoff for Andy 
is still the highest in the case of the power coalition (414 EUR).
8
6 Other experiments produced similar shares for the proposal of Homo Oeconomicus: e.g. 
9% in a national newspaper in Germany with 5,000 participants (Güth et al. 2007) and 14% 
of 381 participants in Piazolo (2007). 
7 The amounts for the proposer Andy, are similar to the ones in Güth et al. (2007) with 516 
EUR and in Piazolo (2007) with 552 EUR. 
8 In our field experiment of 2006, 92% of all 381 participants accepted the power coalition 
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3  Different International Perceptions - US-Americans 
vs. Europeans  
In  their  role  as  proposers,  the  US-Americans  selected  the  equal  split  at  a 
significantly  higher rate than their German or European counterparts (60% vs. 
34%,  chart  1).  Females  also  prefer  the  equal  split  –  and  more  Americans  are 
women,  but  this  cannot  explain  the  large  discrepancy  fully.
9  Just  as  many 
Europeans propose the power coalition(s) to the equal split, and even 11% of 
them suggested the wealth maximizing version of Homo Oeconomicus. For the 
USA, this rate is only 2%.  Therefore, the average proposed sum  for  Andy by 
Americans  is  substantially  less  than  the  one  by  Europeans  (461  EUR  vs.  576 
EUR). 
In addition it is not suprising that business and economics majors vote the most 
for Homo Oeconomicus (14%). Though, economists also suggest equal split and 
the power coalition(s) to a much higher extent (35% and 31% respectively).  
9 53% of all women vote in their role as proposer for an equal split – men only at a rate of 
36%. Though, the female proposal rate is still less than that of all US-Americans with 60%. 
319High aversion of US-Americans towards inequality 
In their role as acceptor or rejector (Berta), only 109 of all participants (21%) do 
accept all of the 18 different proposals. This would give them at least 100 EUR – 
instead of relinquishing these funds and receiving nothing at all. Consequently, 
this  acceptance  rate  is  80%  for  participants  that  suggested  the  Homo 
Oeconomicus right from the beginning.  
A quarter of the German or European participants decide rationally in accepting 
all proposals – for US-Americans this rate is a mere 10%. Therefore, just 14% of 
the  US-participants  accept  the  proposal  of  Homo  Oeconomicus.  Even  for  the 
power coalition there is no majority among US-participants (chart 2). Due to these 
low US-acceptance rates, the expected US-payoff for the equal split (376 EUR) is 
substantially above the ones for the power coalition (294 EUR). 
Homo  Oeconomicus  is  accepted  by  Europeans  at  rate  of  30%.  Though,  the 
expected payoff as Andy is higher for the power coalition (479 EUR) – as this 
proposal registers a high accptance rate of 79%. Females and non-business majors 
accept a 1,000-100-100 split significantly less often (20%) than business majors 
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4  Random Selection of the Proposer – International 
Gap is Leveled Out
In the second version of our experiment, the participants were asked to make the 
same decisions -though, none of the three beneficiaries would know in advance, 
which role they play, when the inheritance is to be split up. So, the proposer – 
Andy – does not know in advance, if he will benefit from his proposal. He might 
end up as Berta or even Carlos. Due to this change in conduct, we expect the rate 
of proposal for an equal split to increase substantially. The empirical data in table 
2 underlines our expectations. Now, three quarters of our participants propose the 
equal split. At same instance, the intercontinental differences in proposal rates 
decline substantially from 26 to 9 percentage points. The reason is the marked 
difference in decision making by the German or European participants. Therefore, 
the average inheritance per person is equalized quite a bit: the difference between 
Andy and Carlos drops from 277 EUR to 105 EUR (see last line in table 1 & 2). 
Table 2: 
 Choice of proposals and international acceptance ratios (random proposer) 
ALL (n = 509) 
Division of 1.200 
EUR    ALL  USA  EUROPE 
USA (n = 162) 













Equal Split 400 400 400 73,08% 97% 79,01% 97% 70,00% 98%
400 500 300 1,96% 75% 3,70% 60% 1,18% 82%
600 300 300 5,11% 59% 2,47% 39% 6,47% 69%
600 400 200 5,30% 56% 4,94% 40% 5,59% 64%
Power Coalition 600 500 100 4,13% 48% 0,62% 34% 5,59% 55%
Homo 
Oeconomicus
1000 100 100  3,93%  27% 1,85%  15% 5,00%  33%
ALL – average 
inheritance per 
person in EUR  459  388  353     
The acceptance rates for Berta do not change significantly. Europeans will still 
accept inequal distributions far more often than their US-counterparts. Therefore, 
the highest expected payoff for Andy in Europe is 414 EUR for the following 
proposal: 600-300-300. Compared to our first version, Europeans seem to punish 
an unfair treatment of (powerless) Carlos now – at least compared to the power 
coalition(s). For US-Americans, equal split still pays off the best for Andy 
5. Final Remarks 
• More  than  500  people  took  part  in  this  unique  mixed  classroom, 
newspaper and internet experiment of an ultimatum bargaining game. 
321Three beneficiaries had to decide, how to split up an inheritance of 1,200 
EUR (or 1,600 USD). One third of the participants were US-Americans – 
mainly from the University of the Incarnate Word in San Antonio, Texas. 
• In their role as proposer (Andy) 42% of all participants vote for an equal 
split (400 EUR each); followed by 18% for the power coalition (600 
EUR – 500 EUR – 100 EUR). Only 8,5% of all participants select the 
wealth maximizing alternative of  Homo Oeconomicus (1,000 EUR – 
100 EUR – 100 EUR). On average, the participants are willing to bid 251 
EUR for the role as proposer.  
• When  having  to  accept  or  reject  each  of  the  18  different  proposals 
(Berta),  the  notions  of  fairness  and  inequality  aversion  dominate 
decision making.  Every proposal, which result in 200 EUR or less for 
Berta,  is  rejected  by  68%-76%  of  the  participants.  These  individuals 
relinquish up to 260 USD, rather than accepting an inequal distribution of 
inheritance. Only one fifth of our economic agents behave fully rational 
by accepting everyone of the 18 different proposals.  
• There  are  statistically  significant  differences  in  behavior  of  US-
Americans  and  Europeans  (95%  German).  US-Americans  are  much 
more equality oriented: 60% of them propose an equal split, while they 
reject in their role as Berta inequal distributions of inheritance far more 
often than Europeans. Just as many Europeans or Germans vote for the 
power coalition(s) and the equal split.  Also, the Germans are bidding 
substantially more money for their role as proposer (270 EUR vs. 203 
EUR).  
• Aversion against inequality in splitting up an inheritance of 1,200 EUR 
is  much  stronger  among  US-Americans.  This  is  a  result,  the  author 
would  have  expected  from  the  Germans  living  in  a  social  market 
economy with substantial characteristics of a welfare state and being less 
riskprone than their US-counterparts. The role of the cultural and ethnic 
background  of  Hispanics  studying  at  a  catholic  institution  –  which 
represent the majority of our US-participants – might explain some of the 
intercontinental divide. This gives plenty of room for additional research 
to be undertaken in the future. 
• On the other hand, the US-Americans might have expected the strong 
inequality  aversion  of  their  peers.  In  that  case,  it  may  be  rational  to 
propose an equal split – since the expected payoff for Andy is the highest 
for the equal split with 376 EUR.
10
• The moment the role of the beneficiaries is randomly assigned to each of 
the three – only after placing their decisions - the proposal rate for the 
equal  split  rises  substantially  (>70%).  At  same  instance,  the 
intercontinental divide vanishes almost totally.  
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Appendix - International winners 
We  chose  the  following  three  representative  particpants  randomly  as  potential 
beneficiaries: Erika T. (Germany), Jose J. (US) und Mathias R. (Switzerland). The 
role of the proposer is based on their bids for Andy. In our case Jose bid 400 EUR, 
while Mathias only placed 100 EUR and Erika no cent at all. Jose’s proposal as 
Andy  was  400-500-300  –  a  proposal  that  was  chosen  by  only  6%  of  all 
participants. Jose apparently wanted to make sure, that Berta is going to accept his 
proposal.11 Erika was drawn for the role as Berta. She accepted the proposal of 
Jose.12 As half of the bid for the role of the proposer (Andy) has to be payed by 
the winning Andy (Jose), 200 EUR go to the US, 300 EUR to Switzerland and 500 
EUR remain in Southern Germany. 
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